CESSP - CRPS

To account for the peaceful mobilisations which started in Syria in March 2011, the authors first demonstrate the irrelevance of rational choice and resource mobilisation theories. They build a model of “deliberative mobilisation”, at the core of which is participation in small groups in which individuals transform their values, their calculations and their sociability. Furthermore, to account for the resilience of the regime and the start of the civil war, the authors propose the concept of a “polarising crisis”, characterised by the limited autonomy of social fields, the widening of individual tactical activities, and the strategic use of violence by the state.

The Taliban established their own judicial system in Afghanistan as both an instrument of population control and as a means to project themselves as an effective parallel government. Despite the heavy reliance on coercion, the Taliban’s method of dealing with common criminality and resolving disputes was often welcome, though the weak appeal system and the rapidity of the trials was sometimes criticized. A more structured approach to coercion, featuring rules, regulation and supervision over the military, allows less use of violence and promises increased predictability for the population, making active resistance less of a necessity. In the long run, the establishment of credible judiciary institutions reshapes the social environment and creates vested interests in favor of Taliban domination.

Voici la première étude sur la guerre civile syrienne faite à partir d’entretiens réalisés en Syrie même et dans les pays voisins.

2011 : des centaines de milliers de Syriens de toutes confessions et origines ethniques manifestent pacifiquement pour réclamer la démocratisation du régime. Au bout de quelques mois, la violence de la répression les contraint à prendre les armes et à organiser une contre-société avec des institutions embryonnaires et à regrouper des unités militaires improvisées au sein de l’Armée syrienne libre.

Après 2013, cette logique inclusive et unanimiste cède progressivement devant la montée des groupes transnationaux comme le PKK et l’État islamique. L’insurrection se fragmente alors avec une polarisation croissante alimentée de l’extérieur. Les groupes les plus modérés sont marginalisés au profit de l’islam politique qui prend des formes de plus en plus radicales et de revendications ethno-nationales kurdes.

Quels sont les effets de la guerre sur la société syrienne ? Quelles nouvelles hiérarchies communautaires et sociales résultent de la violence généralisée ? Comment les trajectoires sociales des Syriens pris dans la guerre sont-elles affectées ? Comment se structure l’économie de guerre alors que le pays est divisé entre le régime, l’insurrection, le PKK et l’État islamique ?

Un livre unique qui combine une recherche de terrain – rare sur le confit syrien – et une réflexion théorique novatrice sur les situations de guerre civile.

Les auteurs montrent – dans le contexte de la guerre civile syrienne – comment l’appartenance à des groupes de manifestants contre le régime constitue un capital social autonome à la fois du capital social antérieur et des autres formes de capital, notamment économique et culturel. Il montre ainsi comment un événement permet la formation de capital. Le capital social n’apparaît pas comme un simple démultiplicateur des capitaux économiques et culturels existants, mais possède sa propre logique de formation et d’accumulation. Dans une phase ultérieure, ce capital social se convertit en positions au sein des institutions révolutionnaires, qui apparaissent alors comme du capital social objectivé. Les dotations initiales en capitaux redeviennent alors déterminantes pour comprendre la probabilité d’accès à différentes positions.

The authors show how, in the context of the civil war in Syria, belonging to groups of protesters against the regime constitutes a variety of social capital that is autonomous both from previous social capital and from other forms of social capital, in particular economic and cultural capital. The article thus shows how an event enables the formation of capital. Social capital does not only have a demultiplying effect on existing economic and cultural capital: it is characterized by its own logic of formation and accumulation. In a subsequent stage, this social capital is converted in positions within the revolutionary institutions, which then appear as an objectified form of social capital. The initial endowments in capital again become decisive if one wants to understand the chances of access to these different positions.

Commonly described as mad, fanatic, and medieval, the Islamic State is a political enigma. The behavior of its militants, its relationship with the local society and its relationship with the rest of the world are all puzzling. While extensive research into the operational structures of the Islamic State is hindered by the clandestine nature of the organization, this paper aims to overcome these difficulties by drawing on over 60 interviews conducted within Syria and Iraq between 2012-2015. These interviews not only examine the emergence, expansion and success of the Islamic State, they also highlight the everyday conditions of those living under its grip. We argue that the perceived irrationality of the Islamic State results from the formation of a new regime of truth, based on an eschatological reading of Islam, which subordinates the alternative modes of veridiction. The Islamic State’s regime of truth allows the coexistence within the same organization of a rational-legal system, an ethic of conviction, and a charismatic legitimacy. To develop our argument, we look successively at the closure of the organization, the imposition of its revolutionary model upon society, and its relationship to the outside world, highlighting its consistency at each level.